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Anne MacL. Malick*

Private Pensions -A
Legislative RepsonseNova Scotia's Pension
Benefits Act

I. Introduction
At the 1975 spring sitting of the Nova Scotia legislature an Act
Respecting Pension Benefits was introduced and passed.' The Act,
though not proclaimed in force as yet, is expected to become
operative sometime during 1976. When it does, it will be
2
administered by the Minister of Finance.
This article is essentially a specific review of the direction of the
Act and an examination of its main areas in the context of the
situation which now exists in relation to private pensions - the
situation to which presumably the Act is a response. As far as
possible, the peculiarities of the Nova Scotia pension situation have
been used as the paper's context. However, because of the scarcity
of statistics relating to the whole area of pension plans in Nova
Scotia, (a scarcity which Department of Labour researchers expect
will be lessened once this Act gets into operation and a more
concerted effort in this area of research will evolve) the Nova Scotia
"picture" will be painted with the rather "broad brush" of general
observations and particular commentary by individuals "close to
the scene", notably J.K. Bell, Secretary Treasurer of the Nova
Scotia Federation of Labour, CLC, the most vocal and avid
supporter of government regulation over pensions, and Percy J.
Fleet, Department of Finance and Advisor to the Minister on
Pensions. In terms of where other jurisdictions are going in pension
legislation, the recent U.S. legislation provides an approach which
is distinctive from this proposed Act and those of other Canadian
provinces which are substantially similar to the Nova Scotia Act. In
the context of alternatives for the future, it warrants some
discussion.
In 1970, 39.2% of the Canadian work force was covered by
private pension plans. 3 In Nova Scotia 30% of those under pension
*Anne Mac L. Malick, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1975.
1. S.N.S. 1975, c. 14 (The Act was assented to on March 27, 1975).
2. Sees. 10.
3. Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, 1970 (Catalogue 74-401. Ottawa:
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plans were in private pension schemes. 4 The Finance Department
estimates that there are 1,000 private plans in Nova Scotia affecting
at least 40,000 workers out of a work force of 264,000. 5 However,
it seems likely that no more than one half of these 40,000 will enjoy
full private pension benefits upon retirement and a great number of
the 40,000 will not receive any benefits at all. This is because of
high labour mobility (most estimates indicate that no more than 20%
of the work force stay with the same employer during their working
life and about 70% of the work force change jobs more than twice)
and because most employees who do move from one employer to
another do not keep up the pension plan they had in the former
employ - either because they cannot due to not having met vesting
requirements of the particular plan or because they choose not to
and voluntarily withdraw from the plan.
Private pension plans are government regulated in five Canadian
jurisdictions - Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Quebec as
well as the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act which applies to
undertakings in federal jurisdiction. 6 The Acts are all substantially
similar and are designed to be - so that the minimum standards
they set will be readily applicable to all plans within these
jurisdictions. The Ontario Pension Benefits Act became law in 1965
and other jursidictions have more or less adopted the Ontario Act
making little more than the necessary legislative adjustments. The
Pensions Benefits Act for Nova Scotia is, in essence, a rewrite of
the Ontario Act - with a notable difference in relation to who is to
administer the Nova Scotia Act.
Until the Act, there was virtually no legislative control over
private pension plans in Nova Scotia. To be eligible for taxation
deductions of pension contributions and income, a private scheme
must be registered with the Department of National Revenue, and
7
there are certain standards which must be met but other than that,
control over private plans rests with the private sector. This control,
in turn, is exercised virtually exclusively by the employer and/or the
carrier who administers the pension funds. The quantity of
Information Canada, 1972) at 12, table B.
4. Id. at 11, chart 2.
5. Nova Scotia Department of Labour (Economics and Research Division),
CurrentLabourForce Statisticsfor Nova Scotia (January, 1975) at 3, table 1.
6. R.S.A. 1970, c.272; S.S. 1967, c.67; R.S.O. 1970, c.342; R.S.Q. 1964, c.14;
R.S.C. 1970, c.P-8.
7. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.63. See Canada Department of National
Revenue, Information Circular 72-13 R, October 19, 1973.
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employee or employee/representative control or participation in
administration is minimal. In any case where such participation
does exist, it is more illusory then real. 8
So, generally, a situation existed in which a legislative reaction
was apparently necessary. Many employees have no pension plan at
all. Employees, whom pensions are specifically designed to benefit,
have no "say" in how pension funds are being handled when a plan
does exist; and a significant number of employees under pension
plans have no assurance that they will, in fact, upon retirement,
receive a pension - either because there will be no funds to pay it
or because, for any of a number of reasons, they will not be eligible
to receive a pension.
Throughout this article's review of the Act, there will be
consideration of the question: How will this legislation meet this
situation in relation to regulating private pensions? - a situation
which has elicited editorials like the following:
Private pension plans are a mysterious grab-bag. Many of them
were designed to keep the worker with the company throughout
his working life and are therefore less than satisfactory at a time
when the work force is highly mobile and is being urged to be
more so. Some have severe limitations. In others, if a company
goes broke or bankrupt or is merged with another company, the
employees may lose part or all of their benefits. 9
H. Purview of the Act
In terms of providing for private pension plans for all employees
presumably by compelling employers to so provide - the Pension
Benefits Act does not require either that pension plans be set up by
employers, nor does the Act require that an employer once having
set up a plan continue it. The Act, by s. 17(7) defines what shall be
done with benefits to which present or former employees have
become entitled if the plan is terminated or wound up ("Wound up"
presumably refers more specifically but probably not exclusively to
the situation per s. 19(1) where the Superintendent of Pensions
deems or declares a pension plan ended). It is well to note that s.
17(7) refers to employees who are entitled to a deferred life annuity
and by s. 17(1) that is only those employees who have worked for
ten years and reached the age of 45 unless their particular plan
provides for a lower requirement before entitlement (s. 17(3) (a)).
8. A general impression one receives from talking with Union officials.
9. The Globe and Mail, October 13, 1973 at 6 (editorial).
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Section 17(8) allows for the possibility of a reduction of the benefits
due under a "deferred life annuity" if the plan is one which existed
before the Act comes into force and which had not provided for
advance funding. Regulations will prescribe the number of years
such an "unfunded" plan has to "catch up" on its funding. (In the
Ontario Act which became effective in 1965, it was fifteen years or
1989 if the unfunded situation resulted from an amendment after
1965). The regulation is permissive, and the reduced rate of benefits
will only apply to benefits accrued or retroactively given in relation
to a time period before the Act's qualification date.
In any case, s. 17(7) and (8) do not refer specifically to present
employees who have not become entitled to a "deferred life
annuity" i.e. those who have not met the "45-10" rule. Unless
regulations are passed under s. 24(e), such employees will have to
depend on their common law rights and the terms of the plan they
are under to "get back" their own contributions or those of the
employer. If the plan is one which has not "caught up" in its
funding obligation, the employee may find that there are
"insufficient funds" to repay whatever amount he may be entitled
to. This is not to be unexpected if the reason for the plan winding up
or terminating is the insolvency of the employer.
The unilateral power of an employer to terminate a pension plan
exists. The possibility of an employer doing that just before the bulk
of his employees reach the "vesting" ("45-10") period has not
been guarded against. A replay of the tragedy in 1957 when
Dominion Steel and Coal Company dismissed twenty employees
just before their vesting date may no longer be possible 10 but a
revision of the same tragedy can be effected - not by unilateral
dismissal - but rather by unilateral termination of their pension
plan.
III. Administration
The Act will be under the administration of its chief officer, the
Superintendent of Pensions (s. 5(1)) with such officers and
employees as are necessary. Section 6(1) specifically gives the
Superintendent the power to engage services of "counsel,
accountants and other experts". In Ontario The Pension Benefits
Act, (s. 2(1)) designated the already existing Pension Commission
10. Trade Union Act. S.N.S. 1972. c. 19. s.51(3) (d).
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as administrator of their Act. Presently, the Commission has a
complement of nine, one of whom is its administrative officer, the
Superintendent of Pensions and an Executive Officer. They work
with a staff of nineteen. It is expected that the Nova Scotia Act will
be administered by the Superintendent, an actuary and an Executive
Officer. It will be interesting to observe whether even the most
fundamental administrative tasks which the Act will require in
relation to approval for registration and over-seeing funding
requirements can be competently carried out by a three-person
administration. In terms of policy orientation and innovation, it
appears (from the annual reports of the Ontario Commission) that
the Pension Commission in Ontario is divided seven to two - the
Superintendent and the Executive Officer handling day-to-day
administration and the seven functioning as a working policy
committee. One gets the general impression that the nonappointment of a Commission for Nova Scotia is a reflection of the
rather low priority the Act has in the legislative scheme of things
rather than a reflection of any planned alternative to the Ontario
administration (since in most other respects, the Ontario Act was
copied slavishly). This impression is reinforced by Department
officials who anticipate that the position of Superintendent will be
an addition to an already existing position within the Department of
Finance.
Section 13 of the Act provides for the establishment or
designation of an agency for the "purpose, among others, of
receiving, holding and dispersing pension benefits credits under the
Act". Such an agency could be needed when by s. 17(7) and (8) a
plan is terminated or wound up and the provisions of the section
regarding what is to be done with the benefits must be complied
with or generally when a function arises by reason of regulations
made in reference to s. 24(1).
A union official objects to the wording of the section in that an
agency can be established or designated. He believes for the Act to
effectively protect these benefits once a plan is discontinued, the
benefits must be handled by the administrators of the Act. However,
he believes, with the option to designate an agency, that is exactly
what will be done. It will be (in his words): ".

.

. just one more

political plum for government to hand out."" Section 10 provides
for the Superintendent's responsibility to the Minister.
11. Id.
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IV. Coverage of Act
The Act is designed to cover all pension plans existing or being
established by employers of employees in Nova Scotia except those
plans in which an employer has no contributing obligation (s. 15(1))
unless such a plan is a supplemental one which is defined by s. 2(n)
as one which has as a condition precedent membership in another
pension plan (s. 15(3)). By s. 15 (1) and (2) all plans are required to
be filed with the Superintendent of Pensions in order to be registered
and must maintain thereafter the qualifications for registration as
prescribed by the Act and its regulations. If the plan so qualifies a
certificate is issued (s. 16).
The Act's provisions are designed to also apply to pension plans
for each province which by s. 2(a) is a: ". . . province or territory
of Canada that is designated by regulation as a province or territory
in which there is in force legislation substantially similar to this
Act." Presently, Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and the
federal government have Acts substantially similar. Section 8 gives
the Superintendent the authority to work out reciprocal registration,
audit and inspection agreements with these jurisdictions and to
generally facilitate uniformity of pension standards.
The advantage of uniformity of legislation is obvious from the
employer's vantage point. He can set up a pension deal for all his
employees knowing that he will not have to meet a variety of
legislative criteria in each different jurisdiction. The advantages to
the employee are less obvious except in so far as he may belong to a
pension plan which allows for portability of his pension funds if he
happens to move from one jurisdiction to another. However,
portability is only rarely included in a plan and the proposed Nova
Scotia Act does not require portability.
It is debatable whether the convenience of uniformity can be
achieved only by "mirror-image" sameness in legislation and in
any case, it would be most unfortunate if striving for uniformity
obscured the vitality of the legislation and effectively prevented
innovative amendments. This may already be happening as
indicated in the comments of Department officials in relation to why
the Act did not consider lower vesting provisions. 12 J.K. Bell
comments that uniformity objectives will be a guise for perpetrating
the "typical Nova Scotia legislative attitude that we should strive to

12. See comment by Percy J. Fleet in text following note 16, infra.
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catch up with other provinces' legislation instead of striking out on
an innovative route of our own".
V. Appeal ProcedureUnder the Act
Although the Act is not designed to affect the "right" of the
employer to, or not to, initiate a pension plan, it will directly restrict
his freedom as to what provisions exactly a plan will contain and
within certain defined limits it will dictate how a pension plan will
be ended. The Act provides the employer with a rather sophisticated
method of appeal from decisions in relation to compliance for
registration, and deeming a plan to be wound up (s. 19). Section 22
allows the employer sixty days to send a notice of objection, with
reasons, to the Superintendent, and requires that the Superintendent
reconsider his opinion and either confirm or vary it. By s.23 if the
Superintendent confirms his opinion or does not notify him at all,
the employer can after 90 days and before 180 days appeal to the
Court of Appeal. The Court will have complete review authority
and its decision is final. The Superintendent must abide by its
decision.
It would seem that the Act provides employers with an avenue of
review which is atypical among regulating Acts which almost
invariably have privative clauses. The "whirl of judicial diffidence
and exemptions from liability", 13 which up to now has been an
indication of the Court's attitude, should be a source of some
assurance to the employer that the "ear the Court lends" will not be
an unsympathetic one.
VI. EligibilityProvisions
The Act defines an employee generally as someone who has worked
for an employer for six months (s. 2(b)). However, in setting down
criteria for registration, it is nowhere required that an employer of
employees must make his plan available to all his employees who
come under the Act's definition. Therefore, even under the Act, two
situations are possible in relation to eligibility: 1) An individual plan
can specify a longer time period than six months before an
employee can start participating in a plan; or 2) There can
conceivably be established discriminatory eligibility criteria which
will not prevent the plan from being registered.
13. J. Fichaud,Pensions:APrimerforLawyers (1975), 2 Dal. L.J. 367.
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While it is reasonable to expect that discriminatory features of a
plan would result in the Superintendent's rejection of the plan - if
for no other reason than they are illegal under the Human Rights
Act, it is not unreasonable to suspect that much discrimination does
pass the vigilance of pension act administrators. Statistics Canada
reveals an enormous disproportion between retirement age, benefit
rates, and especially disability and survivor's benefits for men as for
women and these statistics were compiled in relation to all plans in
Canada including the five jurisdictions which had Pension Benefits
Acts in 1970.14 In any case, there is nothing in the Act which can
regulate the level of the age criterion itself.
VII. Vesting and Locking - in Provisions
Section 17(1) of the proposed Act is designed to ensure that, under
certain conditions, the pension of an employee will be preserved if
either he leaves the employment or for some other reason his
participation in a pension plan is terminated before he reaches
retirement age. This preservation of pension rights - vesting will result in the employee being entitled to a "deferred life
annuity" (s. 2(d)) upon retirement.
Specifically, the section requires every pension plan to
"contractually provide" that if a member of the plan is in the
service of an employer for a "continuous period" (s. 2(1)) of ten
years or has been a member of the same plan for that period and has
attained the age of 45, he will be entitled to the deferred life annuity
upon retirement whether he leaves the employment or stops
participating in the plan. So, if an employee "sticks with" a job for
ten years and reaches the age of 45, he will have vested rights to his
pension funds from then on - that will include his own and his
employer's contributions. Section 17(3) (a) recognizes that this
vested right may, by the terms of the plan itself, be provided at an
earlier period of time or at an earlier age. The fact is that on a
Canada-wide basis in 1970, 91.8% of pension participating
employees - not already under legislation - did have vested rights
and 76.4% of these plans had earlier vesting provisions than the
"45-10" rule. 15 Assuming the Nova Scotia situation to be roughly
similar, the vesting standard laid down by the Act will ensure that
additional benefits be extended to 23.6% more employees - the
14. Supra, note 3 at 44-49.
15. Supra, note 3 at 23, table 1.
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8.2% with no present vesting rights and the 15.4% with later vesting
rights than the Act will require.
In reality, however, the benefits of vesting rights were far less
far-reaching than statistics would indicate. In practice by far the
majority of workers voluntarily chose to forfeit employer
contributions and withdraw their own when they left their
employment before retirement - whether or not the right to the
benefit was vested. 16 The Act, to actually effect the preservation of
pensions on a wider scale then already existed, had to somehow
ensure that employees would, in fact, take advantage of these
vesting provisions. This was accomplished by s. 17(c) which
effectively forces an employee to be prudent about his funds. Once
an employee becomes entitled to a deferred life annuity under the
Act - i.e. "45-10" requirement - he is not entitled to withdraw
any of his contributions under the plan. They are "locked in" and
remain there and shall be applied to his deferred life annuity. There
are exceptions:
1) The employee may withdraw voluntary additional contributions (s. 2(o)) i.e. ones which the employer does not have to
"match".
2) By s. 17(3) (b) he may receive the commuted value of the
deferred life annuity to which he has become entitled - i.e.
which has vested and which includes his own and employer's
contributions - if the amount of this annuity upon retirement
would be less than $10.00 a month and was only payable in his
life time -i.e. did not have any survivor's benefits provisions.
3) He may "cash in" up to 25% of the commuted value of his
deferred life annuity and receive a lump sum either upon
termination of his employment or participation in the plan or at
any time before retirement.
4) By s. 17(5) and (6), the deferred life annuity to which an
employee is entitled may be replaced by an annuity which is not a
"match up" of the employer and employee contributions (s.
17(1)) but which makes allowance for an annuity to the
employee's survivor or his estate; or allows for mental or
physical disability payments, in part or total replacement of the
annuity; or allows for an early retirement annuity (with certain
conditions).
How realistic is a "45-10" standard in this age of high mobility
mobility of both employers and employees? Or for that matter,
what is the "magic" of 45 and 10? The CBC public affairs TV
program on pensions "That Wonderful Day When I Reach 65"

-

16. Supra, note 13 at 8.
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depicted the widespread tragedy of workers deprived of pension
rights even though they had worked in jobs which had pension plans
for most of their lives. The Ontario Pensions Commission in its
1972 annual report issued a "Green Paper" proposing that the Act's
vesting provisions be lowered to five years of service and age 40.
This working paper recognized the social arguments for changing
the standard - for the sake of the individual employee and the
society's welfare. It acknowledged the logical basis for requiring
immediate vesting when pensions are considered a form of deferred
pay but resisted proposing immediate vesting because it would
necessarily involve 1) unwarranted additional contributions from
employers and employees 2) probably lower benefits to those who
do not get a benefit from immediate vesting and 3) creation of a
great number of small pension benefits which would be
prohibitively expensive to administer. 17 Thus far, these assumptions against immediate vesting have gone more or less unchallenged by proponents of immediate vesting. In terms of
administrative efficiency, however, it would seem that ten years and
age 45 (or five years and age 40) more than allows for even the most
prohibitive administrative costs when one considers that an
employee can amass an appreciable amount of pension credits in ten
or five years. In terms of additional cost, the new U.S. Act 18 which
contains rather drastic provisions for vesting in relation to what
existed in most plans before the legislation, estimates that additional
cost will be moderate and cost was rejected as a factor which would
impede plan growth. In any case, the cost argument can only be
taken so far before it becomes a reason for no pension at all.
Because of apparently negative "feedback" from employers and
carriers of pension funds, the proposal of the Commission which
was expected to become an amendment in 1973 still remains at the
proposal stage. Percy J. Fleet, Advisor to the Minister on the matter
of pensions, indicates that until Ontario adopts lower vesting
standards, Nova Scotia will not - in the interest of uniformity. He
felt that cost to employers is an even more pressing reason for not
lowering the requirement in Nova Scotia than it is in Ontario.
VIII. Employee's Lack of Control

The disproportion between an employee's stake in a pension plan
17. Ontario Pension Commission, Ninth Annual Report (1972), Appendix B.
18. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, P.L. 93-406; 88 Stat.
829.
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and his control over it was the subject of a research paper. The paper
considered the employee's lack of control in terms of knowing that
the pension benefits would indeed be available when he was eligible
to receive them i.e. funding security; the employee's abstraction
from the actual investment performance of funds and his total lack
of any decision-making power in the administration of his pension
plan.
Timid unions have failed to assert the employee's rights to
control the administration of his pension. The common law is a
whirl of judicial diffidence and exemptions from liability.
Registration under the Income Tax Act is voluntary at the
employer's discretion, and lower taxes from the employer require
higher levies on other tax payers, so the value of the Act's bought
virtue is questionable. The alternative to legislated protection of
pensions is poverty for many retired employees. The obvious
remedy is the passage of a Nova Scotia Pension Benefits
Standards Act. 19
This conclusion will serve as a locus for reviewing the major
provisions of the Act regarding funding, investment regulation,
disclosure requirements and administrative control of pension plans.
IX. Funding Provisions
The "problem" with pension plans in relation to funding was that
there existed two "unfunded methods" for employers to cover or
meet their contributions in a fund. These two methods 1)
terminal and 2) pay-as-you-go, when used by employers, were a
constant source of insecurity for the employee in terms of having a
pension plan. By the terminal method the employer discharges his
total liability at the date of retirement; by the "pay-as-you-go"
method, the pension is paid directly from the employer's working
capital when the pension becomes due. There is no fund and no
carrier. This plan has been derisively referred to as the
"pay-if-you-can" method. With either method, insolvency of the
employer could shatter the plan. The carrier had not the money and
the employee was in the position of unsatisfied debtor against an
insolvent or bankrupt employer. The Act effectively outlaws both
methods and each pension plan must meet solvency requirements
which are premised on the requirements that there be used some
method of advance funding, i.e. assets available for all pension
credits already accumulated by employees. Section 18(1) (a)
19. Supra, note 13 at 36.
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specifies that there be funds for "all pension benefits (s. 2(f)),
deferred life annuities (s. 2(d)) and other benefits".
The specific solvency tests are to be prescribed by regulations.
Ontario Regulation 654/4 outlines the solvency requirement "test"
that Act requires. More accurately, it outlines what the administrators of the Act will require to be satisfied that a plan is solvent.
There shall be a report made every three years: the report must
certify 1) estimated cost benefits for the next succeeding year and
the rule for computing such cost in subsequent years until the next
report 2) a "run down" of any surplus or "experience deficiency"
(s. 2(c) describes this as being a deficiency at that time, i.e. at
review of the plan for the report) less any special payments required
to be made in future because of a previous deficiency 3) special
payments required to liquidate a deficiency over a term not
exceeding five years and 4) any such additional information the
Commission requires. Amendments to the report are to be made if
the Commission is not satisfied that the report was prepared using
"assumptions which are adequate and appropriate and methods
consistent with the sound principles established by precedence or
common usage within the actuarial profession". It should be noted
'that the report is to be made up by an actuary or, for certain plans,
by an accountant or person authorized by the carrier of the plan.

Furthermore, by Reg. 654/7, every pension plan shall be deemed to
be solvent if it is fully or provisionally funded - the latter being
one which is not funded but has provisions for special payments to
liquidate deficiencies. Mercer and Coward indicate that the funding
certification will not be seriously challenged for " . . . provincial

pension authorities do not intend to prescribe actuarial assumptions
and methods and
be accepted" .20

. . .

normally the certificate of an actuary

. . .

will

As to solvency, there is probably no reason to seriously question
the standards of the actuarial profession. However, there is another
very significant facet to funding which apparently the Act does not
intend to regulate and that is the way in which contribution
obligations to the plan are to be divided between employer and
employee. Almost invariably, the employer's obligation will be
flexible and will thus rise and fall with the fortunes of the fund: the
employee's contribution, on the other hand, will be fixed. If the
20. W. Mercer, Canadian Handbook of Pension and Welfare Plans, rev. ed. L.
Coward (4th ed. Don Mills, Ontario: C.C.H. Canadian Ltd., 1972) at 261.
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plan performs at least adequately, the cost to the employer will
probably decrease.
X. Investment Regulation Provisions
Douglas Fullerton, former Chairperson of the National Capital
Commission has stated:
Many pension funds are run by company executives lacking
professional investment experience. Conflicts of interest abound.
Many firms use the buying power of their pension funds to
strengthen their business connections; governments use theirs as
a convenient dumping place for their bond issues. Few pension
funds ever expose their income record to public (or even
employee) view or apply the most elementary performance tests.
Bad management is able to conceal its mistakes, hindering
corrective action. 21
One labour leader states that the Nova Scotia situation is every bit
as dismal if not more so. He believes that the average investment
return is far lower than it could be, using even the safest investment
criterion. In terms of performance review, what there is is
inadequate. Unions have been able to get only meagre disclosure
commitments from employers; and membership on advisory boards
is as far as they have come to being able to direct how the
investment will be handled in the first place. He contends that such
boards have little power being more or less "window
dressing". 22
Whether this may be overstating the case, or not, there is no
paucity of "real life" examples which do give rise to some
uneasiness about investment practices in relation to pension
funds. 2 3 Unions are, to some extent, involved in the administration
of only about five hundred out of the more than twenty thousand
private pension plans which exist in Canada. 24 Thus, there are a
great many plans whose investment practices go unregulated by any
body representing the peculiar interests of the employees where

21. E. Finn, The Casefor Co-Management of Employee Pension Funds (1973), 73

Lab. Gaz. 3 56 at 357.

22. J. K. Bell in personal interview.
23. Toronto and Montreal policemen pension funds yielding 4% interest
subsidizing the municipalities; see Finn, supra, note 21 at 356. Dalhousie Fund
substantially "sunk" in Cape Breton bonds returning 2'/2%; see Fichaud, supra,
note 13 at 21.
24. Finn, supra, note 21 at 356.
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their interest might differ from that of the employer or carrier of the
plan.
Section 18(1) (c) states that a pension plan shall contractually
provide for "investment of pension fund monies in the securities
and loans prescribed by the regulations".
Ontario Regulation 654/14 basically prescribes that funds can be
invested in or loaned to those same investments and loans that are
open to an insurance company governed by any of the appropriate
regulating acts. In addition, 1% of the fund may be invested in real
estate or leaseholds in Canada but only for the producing of income;
7% may be invested in investments or loans not authorized by the
Act. Certain "improper" loan practices are prohibited - those to
wives and children of employers or directors, or to corporations
controlled by them (presumably this would include the husband of
such employer or director?!); to officers, employees or administrators of the funds, and to employees of the employers except for
mortgages on their principal residence. Diversification is encouraged by limiting investment in and loans to any one business entity
or person to 10% of the total value of the fund.
However, the apparent thrust of the regulation to prevent the
concentration of funds in any one investment or loan and to prevent
investments or loans likely to give rise to conflicts of interest is not
carried through to a) pooled, segregated or mutual funds; or b) the
shares of a corporation if its assests are at least 98% cash,
investments and loans, if it does not issue debt obligation and
obtains at least 98% of its income from investment and loans - and
these funds generally would "fit under" the restrictions this
regulation imposes. In effect then, investment up to any percentage
of the total value of the fund may conceivably be invested in the
company of the employer or administrator. J. K. Bell is not
impressed by the investment regulations of the Ontario Act since by
this latter provision he believes the Act is reneging on the very
control which was required to prevent the self-serving investment of
pension funds. He states that the requirements of the regulation can
easily be complied with while still continuing the very practices
which made the Fullerton statements an accurate picture of
investment practices which now abound.
Nowhere do the Act or the regulations under it attempt to impose
any performance standards on the investment practices; certain
unwise practices such as too great a concentration of funds and
certain conflict of interest loans and practices are prevented but in so
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far as Fullerton's statement is an accurate picture of the performance
of most pension funds, the Ontario Act does not change the
"picture" nor will the Nova Scotia Act if it adopts the Ontario
regulations (which it is expected to do).
XI. DisclosureRequirements
The Act provides that each employee must be given a written
explanation of the pension plan in which he participates - its terms
and its conditions and an explanation of his rights and duties with
reference to benefits available to him - and any other information
as may, by regulation, be prescribed (s. 18(1) (b)).
The experience of the Ontario Pension Commission was that this
subsection (precisely similar) was ineffective. Members were not
receiving the information to which they were entitled. In 1973 it
was repealed and a more strictly - worded subsection replaced it.25
The new provision requires that the employee receive the
information within a certain time and when he leaves the
employment entitled to an immediate or deferred pension he shall
receive a written statement showing the pension benefits to which
he is entitled. Whether the adoption of the old subsection was by
design or inadvertence could not be ascertained. Whichever, it
would appear that the objective of the subsection should be able to
be met either way. Section 25(1) makes it an offence punishable on
summary conviction to contravene any of the provisions of the Act
or the regulations. A fine of between two hundred and ten thousand
dollars ($200-$ 10,000) could be used as a rather effective deterrent.
Section 18(1) (b) is clearly confined to disclosure requirements in
relation to description of the plan and the benefits rights of the
employee under the plan. The Act contains no specific reference to
disclosure requirements by an employer or carrier to the employee
in relation to funding or investment practices or fund investment
performance. Section 15(4) requires that information returns be
filed with the Superintendent but these returns are not required to be
made available to the employee. In any case, the Ontario regulation
requirement is a simple bookkeeping and general information
profile. If by s. 7(2) the Superintendent should choose to exercise
his powers of inspection and inquire into an employer's or
administrator's investment practices and performance there is no
25. Supra, note 17 at 4; see now The Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.342,

s.23(b) as am. by S.O. 1973, c. 113, s.6.
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provision that the employee will see any such information. J.K. Bell
feels that the lack of any provisions making the employer or
administrators of a fund responsible to the employee - at least by
requiring them to keep him informed of how his fund is being
administered - is indicative of the most serious weakness of the
Act. That is, its attitude that the employee is somehow "incidental"
in the over-all scheme of pensions - he "pays up" and he gets a
pension - maybe - and that is the extent of his role.
It is certain that the Act - as far as disclosure requirements are
concerned - is not responding to a recommendation of the Nova
Scotia Federation of Labour CLC in its 1973 presentation to the
Legislature. At that time they proposed as part of a pension
regulation Act -[a] disclosure requirement to all employees showing
at least annual receipts, disbursements, investment earnings,
26
portfolio of investments and the assets and liabilities of the plan".
Certain government officials expressed the view that such
disclosure requirements have low priority with individual employees who do not really care to know or find out how their funds
are being administered. It may have been interesting to verify this
assumption by providing them with the opportunity and the
mechanism to find out.
XII. Portability
One area which is frequently discussed in relation to the state of
private pension schemes has not been dealt with by the legislation
- that is portability of pension funds.
Portability is basically the ability of an employee to carry his
pension benefits with him when he leaves one employer for another.
Presently, pension plans rarely contain provisions for portability.
The most cited reason for not providing for it has been the
administrative difficulties and inconvenience involved in transposing of funds from one plan to another. However, the magnitude of
the difficulties has probably been overstated. The leading Canadian
authority on private pension schemes has stated:
• . . This procedure is portability in a literal sense and to carry it
out the various pension plans involved do not need to be similar.
The actuaries of the first employer calculate the reserve held in
the fund in respect of the employee, and all or part of this reserve
. . . is paid directly to the pension fund of the second employer.
26. Presentation of Nova Scotia Federation of Labour to the Government of Nova
Scotia, January 10, 1973 at 33.
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The actuaries of the second employer calculate the amount of
pension or the number of years of credited service which may be
reasonably granted the new employee in respect of the transferred
funds. Usually the details of the calculation method are contained
in a reciprocal transfer
agreement between the funds involved in
27
the transaction.
The problem of jurisdictional differences among provinces
cannot be seriously raised as an objection - at least in those
jurisdictions where there exists uniform pension benefits legislation,
i.e. federal government jurisdiction, Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Ontario, Quebec, and now Nova Scotia.
One writer suggests a further reason for why portability is not
included in pension schemes: ".

.

. as an inducement to retain an

employee by fear of his losing something to which he otherwise
would have been entitled...,,.28 If this is true, his reference to it
as "archaic and morally indefensible" would seem appropriate.
The advantages to the employer and the employee seem obvious.
The employer, in effect, gets rid of a liability which he may
otherwise have to keep a record of for many years - until either the
retirement or death of the employee; the employee enjoys the
enormous financial advantages of his benefits being involved in the
dynamics of a "live" pension plan.
On a larger view, in terms of an employee having some "say" in
the fate of his benefits - whenever and by whatever means he
achieves this - portability of funds would seem almost essential. In
fact, if the objective of an employee participating in administration
of his funds is ever deemed to be desirable or necessary, the
administrative convenience argument can be turned on its head, and
it will obviously be most inconvenient to not have portability of
pension benefits when the employee leaves a plan. It is interesting
to note that unions -

in Nova Scotia at least -

on "pushing for"
concern. 29

portability. However, their's is a tactical

place a low priority

XIII. Administrationof Funds and the Employee
The concept of a pension being a form of deferred wages is now a
27. Supra, note 20 at 43.

28. The Law Society of Upper Canada, Labour Law Part II, Part D "Pension
Plans" at 16.

29. J.K. Bell says portability, with 75% of salary at age 60, is what unions want to
"press for" in the Canada Pension Plan and therefore they want to concentrate their
efforts in that direction.
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generally accepted proposition - the idea of pension schemes as
"grace-and-favour" arrangements bestowed by an employer upon
his employees no longer stands up in law or in principle. The
deferred wage concept is at least implicit in the Canadian pension
benefits legislation - although it may be inconsistently followed
through in the provisions of an Act (especially in relation to vesting
as a superimposed "right" which a pension plan must provide for
rather than simply a logical consequence of a wage earner having a
"right" to his earned wages).
In so far as wages once earned are subject to an ownership right
on the part of the earner - and even if it is accepted that this right
somehow does not arise until the benefits are vested - it should
follow that anyone in possession of the funds has a duty to look after
them. (In relation to those "deferred wages" not yet vested, the
duty is no less so for it can not be said that the wage earner - the
employee -

has no interest in these funds until then -

anymore

than it can be said that a purchaser, for example, whose ownership
is delayed until the full price has been paid can be said to have no
interest in the article purchased - he does whether he or a third
person possesses it). The administrator of a pension plan is, in
effect, holding these benefits for the employer and owes to him a
duty of care. The validity of this concept should in no way be
affected or tempered by either of two situations 1) the administrator
of the funds also happening to be the employer or 2) the funds
having been placed directly into the plan by the employer (rather
than the two step process of some going through the employee's
hands first).
Two possible ways that this duty of the administrator to the
employee could be effectuated are: 1) a kind of fiduciary duty upon
the administrator to handle the funds generally in the best interests
of the employee and more particularly in accordance with certain
conditions placed upon him by a) the contractual relationship
between him and the employee or b) legislative standards imposed
upon him. And 2) a measure of control in the actual administration
of the funds a) by the employee which would, in effect, enable him
to make sure that his best interests are being served or b) by
government regulation for the same purpose.
As to the administrator's fiduciary duty to the employee, Mr.
Fichaud's research has indicated that outside of legislative
regulation, there is at best a begrudging concession that there is a
duty at all and there is hopeless confusion as to just what standard of
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care is imposed by this duty. The Act does impose upon the
employer qua employer a certain minimum standard of care.
However, the Act is effectively silent as to what duty exists towards
the employee once the funds from a registered plan are in the hands
of the administrator - be it the employer or an "independent"
carrier of the funds. Provisions are there in relation to fund
investment and dispersal but the general duty that an administrator
must handle funds in the best interest of the employee cannot be
extrapolated from these specific and confined regulations.
It could perhaps be expected therefore that the legislation,
cognizant of the employee's stake in making the funds perform in
his best interests and chosing not to impose a comprehensive
standard of care on the administrator, would instead provide for
some measure of on-going administrative control either by the
employee - if he wished to exercise it or by government taking on
a continuing role in the administration of the funds as a "stand-in"
for the employee.
In terms of employee control, the Act does not make any
allowance for it-neither "encouraging" it nor making it a
pre-requisite for registration that a plan provide for it. Outside the
Act, it was noted that the position of the employee in the
administrative set-up of his plan is innocuous. What participation he
experiences has been obtained through half-hearted union pressure;
the fortuity of employer's "good graces" and recourse to the courts
after a problem has arisen.
In terms of government being involved in the administration of
pension funds, the Act does not explicitly provide for this except in
so far as the Superintendent has the authority and the duty to require
the trustee or insurer of a plan to furnish information necessary to
ascertain whether the Act is being complied with (s. 7(2) (b)) and to
"promote the improvement" of pension plans (s. 7(1)). It would
require a fair bit of administrative elasticity to stretch these
provisions so that they would cover the situation of the
Superintendent adopting a continuous role in the administration of
pension funds-likewise the authority of the Governor-in-Council
to establish an agency (under s. 13) could not be used as a basis for
such a role. The extent of government control in the administration
of funds is restricted to its "watch dog" role in relation to
investment practices. And this role is more or less confined to
approval of the practices of the administrator - as long as they are
actuarially and financially sound.
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The energies involved even in this role may prove to be
overwhelming (on top of the rather more involved function of
controlling funding practices) if indeed the administration of the Act
remains with only three persons - as Mr. Fleet anticipates it will.
The Ontario Act provides for a Commission of nine and a
specialized actuarial staff and, yet after nine years of operation
under the Act, the Commission Report in 1973 stated that it has just
recently been able to shift its emphasis and energies from
supervision of funding to comprehensive supervision of investment
30
practices.
XIV. Other Provisions
The following is a cursory look at some other sections of the
proposed Act which, while important, are not easily incorporated
into a discussion of the legislation as a "response to unfavourable
conditions which existed in relation to private pension plans".
1. Provision in Relation to Payment Into and Out of a Pension Fund
Section 17(9) requires that a pension plan shall provide for
calculation of contributions and benefits according to a formula
prescribed by regulation. Section 20 specifically prohibits any
"accrual of benefits" method which is not gradual or does not allow
for spreading out of accrual in relation to the employees' years of
contributions. Also, the contributions by the employer and those out
to employees must be set down and unless the Superintendent
specifically approves, there will be no variation at the employer's
discretion.
The Ontario Act does not contain a section 20 but the same is
accomplished by use of their regulation - making authority and their
comparable section to s. 17(9) - Reg. 654/10, 654/11, 654/12 are,
in fact, simply a reiteration of what the Nova Scotia Act lays down
ins. 20.
2. Restrictions on Employee's Use of Pension Benefits
Section 17(1) (b) provides that an "employee, his personal
representative or dependant, or any person" cannot assign or
otherwise alienate the pension benefits or deferred life annuity to
which that employee is entitled. Effectively, this subsection
30. Supra, note 17 at 2.
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prevents the benefits or annuity from becoming a security for any
indebtedness of the employee and so saves his pension from the
employee's possible financial imprudence.
Section 17(2) (a) and (b) control the relationship of the employee
and employer in relation to the employer divesting himself of either
his annuity or pension benefits by surrendering them or having them
commuted. By s. 17(2) (c) an employee cannot withdraw his
contribution while still employed with that employer or while the
plan still exists even though his entitlement to an annuity has not yet
arisen (i.e. not yet vested).
XV. A FurtherComment
In 1973, the Ontario Pension Benefits legislation was amended and
five major changes were effected. 31 The Nova Scotia Act has
adopted one of these provisions in the Ontario Act and therefore it is
likely by design that the others were not adopted. Reference has
already been made to the adoption of the old Ontario provision in
relation to written explanations of a pension plan to employees
32
instead of the new amended one.
Their s. 21, which is equivalent to Nova Scotia's s. 17, has an
added subsection which provides that, when an employee becomes
entitled to an annuity upon retirement or a deferred annuity upon
termination of either his employment or the plan and it is found that
his benefit credits under the annuity are less than the total of his
contributions to the plan, his credits shall be increased at least to the
level of his contributions.
The Ontario Act also contains a provision deeming that employer
and employee contributions are being held in trust for payment into
the fund. The section is designed to clarify the "status" of these
contributions if the employer becomes bankrupt or is placed in
receivorship.
The Pension Commission had experienced some difficulty in
ensuring that the status of a member in a plan did not change simply
because the employer company merged or otherwise underwent
major reorganization. Thus a declaratory type of section was added
to state that "the employee members of the plan would not lose their
pension rights".
Sections 17(9) and 18(2) of the Nova Scotia Act contain
cross-references to pension plans filed for registration as required by
31. Id. at 3-4.
32. Supra, note 25.
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s. 14. Finance Department officials state that this is, indeed, a
clerical error and should be reference to s. 15 instead of s. 14.
XVI. United States PensionsLegislation
The Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (Pension
Reform Act) became effective law in the United States in September
of 1974. The purview of this legislation is basically similar to that of
Canadian pension benefits legislation, i.e. its approach is to set
minimum standards to which private pension schemes must
conform - yet in its setting of some standards, it has gone
significantly further than any of the Canadian legislation. And none
of them appear to be less comprehensive. The context in which the
legislation was enacted is not inherently different from the general
Canadian or particular Nova Scotian picture. The preexisting
conditions which brought on the legislative response may have been
more dramatic -

because of sheer size -

but the problems to

which it is a response were much the same. Furthermore, the usual
constitutional distinctions which are posited as making an American
legislative approach inappropriate to the Canadian political situation
are not a prevailing factor in relation to regulation of private
pensions - this is especially so in view of the priority given to
uniformity and reciprocity in the various provincial acts.
Like the Canadian legislation, the U.S. Act is "constrained to
recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans"; 3 3 and
the standards which were felt to be an improvement of the pension
system were nonetheless balanced against the added cost these
standards would represent to individual plans.
As to added cost and the adverse effect it would have on the
number of plans now available as well as the discouraging effect it
would have on the growth of more private schemes, the approach of
the legislators seemed to have been 1) a comprehensive cost
analysis of what each standard would entail to determine if, in fact,
the cost would be prohibitive, thus making the advantage the
imposed standard would effect not worth it; 2) if the cost was
prohibitive but only to a certain group, i.e. the "small employer",
to build in flexibility to make special provision for them instead of
"scraping" the standards altogether.
Some of the major features of the minimum standard legislation
are:
33. P.L. 93-406; 88 Stat. 829. See s. 2 .
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Eligibility: Once an employee has worked for an employer for one
year and has reached twenty-five years of age, he must be allowed
to participate in the pension plan. If he has worked for more years
than one before reaching age twenty-five, he must be credited with
each year after the first year requirement up to a maximum of three
years. The only exception to this past services benefits is if upon
reaching age twenty-five the employee has immediate vesting of
pension rights. 34 Our Act does not establish any restriction on
eligibility requirements.
Vesting: The legislation provides for three optional methods of plan
vesting but all of them are designed so that an employee's rights are
at least 50% vested after ten years of service and 100% vested after
35
fifteen years - whatever his age.
Formula A: Gradual vesting - 25% of benefits are vested after
five years of service, increased by 5% for each of the succeeding
five years; 10% for each of the succeeding years after that so that
after fifteen years of service, the employee has his pension benefits
100% vested.
Most commentaries on optimal vesting requirements have stated
that even ten years is prohibitively high in terms of most employees
who are classified as "mobile" or "highly mobile" - the seeming
advantage of partial vesting after five years may be offset by the
likelihood that this gradual "piece offering" of pension benefits
will be used to make it decidedly non-profitable for an employee to
leave his place of employment - a more subtle method of "pension
slavery".
Formula B: 100% vesting after ten years of service - no age
requirement and no graded vesting.
Formula C: 50% vesting when years of service plus age total
forty-five - increasing at 10% per year for the next five years
thereafter - subject to a minimum of five years of service and a
maximum of ten years for the initial 50% vesting.
Funding: Like the Nova Scotia proposed legislation, some form of
advance funding which is "actuarially sound" must be provided for
by each plan. The regulations covering these requirements are more
specific than the Ontario regulations, for example, but the over-all
standards set are similar.
Disclosure Requirements: Disclosure requirements seem to be more
34. Id., s.202.
35. Id., s.203.
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cognizant of the place of the individual employee in the pension
plan scheme of things. The administrators of the plan have a duty
imposed upon them to a) file with government (specifically the
Department of Labor) a detailed description of each plan and an
annual report containing an independent public accountant audit and
opinion and an actuarial statement of complete valuation.
Government in turn makes these reports available to public
inspection as matters of "public information". Further, the
administrators must provide each participant with a description of
the plan - such description being first subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Labor, and each participant is to be furnished with a
summary of the annual financial report. 3 6
Portability: There is no requirement that plans be portable. A task
force is to study the situation in relation to portability and report
within two years. However, there is a kind of "encouragement" for
a plan to provide portability in that the Department of Labor will
hold the funds on a tax-free basis until an employee finds a plan
which will accept the funds and in addition the Department will
provide the actuarial assistance required to have the benefits
transferred.
There are two areas in which the U.S. legislation is decidedly
distinct from the proposed Pension Benefits Act.
1. TerminationInsurance
Pension benefits legislation still leaves the participating employee
with his greatest source of insecurity - that of not knowing whether
the pension plan to which he belongs will continue in existence until
his retirement or remain existent throughout his retirement. The
U.S. legislation provides a new level of protection for pension
participants whose benefits are vested - pension insurance.
A Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation has been set up under
the authority of the Department of Labour. The pension insurance is
compulsory and must be purchased for each employee by the
administrator of the plan (Eventually payments will be in relation to
a company's "unfunded" risk, but initially there is a flat rate of one
dollar per employer or $.50 if the plan is a multicompany union
negotiated one). If an employee loses his vested pension rights
because of termination of a plan, he will be entitled to receive either
36. Id., ss.102-107.
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100% of his average wages for five of his highest paid years of
37
employment or a maximum of $750.00 monthly.
2. FiduciaryRepsonsibility of Administrators

The legislation explicitly establishes a relationship of legal
responsibility of the administrators of pension funds to the
employee whose fund it is. Every fund is deemed to be a trust held
for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable administrative expenses.
A fiduciary is widely defined as anyone who "exercises any
power of control, management or disposition with regard to a fund's
assets or who has the authority to do so ... ".
The standard of care for which any fiduciary is liable is the duty
to discharge their duties with respect to the fund "solely in the
interest of the participants and with the care, skill, prudence and
diligence . . . that a prudent man . . . would." There are specific

"do's and don'ts" for the administrator in relation to investment
which indicate that at least the "most elementary performance
38
tests" will be applied to an administrator's actions.
The liability of a fiduciary for a breach of duty involves civil or
criminal prosecution; any "equitable or remedial relief as a court
may deem appropriate"; and specifically personal liability to make
good any losses to the plan and restore any profits which reasonably
would have been made if the breach had not occurred.
XVII. Conclusion

The Pension Benefits Act is a legislative response to a situation.
The situation is the anomaly of private pensions plans which are
inherently designed to provide the employee with financial security
being instead a major source of the employee's greatest insecurity.
There exists in relation to employees and their pension plan an
inherent conflict which in great part created the anomaly in the first
place. That is the conflict between commitment to the view that
pensions benefits are a form of deferred wages earned and owned by
the employee and yet in reality they are not only administered solely
by the employer or a body designated by the employer but there is
also resistance to any effort to have employers relinguish control
37. Id., ss.401-406.
38. Id., s.Ill.
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over the funds. Problems were bound to arise. The employer's
interests, are, for the most part, not the same as the employee's and
often are directly contrary. And in any case, the dynamics of the
employee's self-interest in the funds can not be infused by another
body.
In this writer's opinion, the Act has responded to some of the
effects of this conflict but has not provided for any steps to resolve
the conflict itself. It is more or less a response to the symptoms but
not the ailment. The Act prevents many of the prevailing practices
which worked against the interest of the employee-including some
of the employee's own practices; and has prescribed a number of
practices which will enhance the employee's pension security.
Throughout this paper it has been indicated that these measures,
while they are positive steps, are less than comprehensive and too
often political expendiency in favour of employers has resulted in
inadequate legislative control.
However, in the final analysis, the greatest weakness of the Act
lies not with the inadequacy of the standards it imposes but rather its
non-response to the basic issue-where does the employee "fit"
into his pension plan. J.K. Bell says the Act considers the employee
as a "merely incidental" member in the pension scheme. A
complete review of the Act indicates that this is indeed the. case.
There is no provision for employee representation in the
administration of the plan; no serious attempt to keep the employee
informed of how his pension plan is performing; no concept of
fiduciary responsibility of the administrator to the employee.
Government itself has refrained from taking a role in the
administration and control as representative of the employee's
interest.
Therefore, if, indeed, the "problems" with private pensions stem
from the basic contradiction of having the primary interest in and
right to the funds in one party -

the employee -

and yet control

over the funds in another-the employer- the problem will remain
unaltered by the Act. The negative effects may be lessened but the
problem remains.
Unless concentrated pressure on government can force a
reassessment of their role, employees are left to resolve the conflict
- though the concerted effort of their existing unions or employee
associations or through the initiation of an alternative method of
pension planning free of employer involvement and free from the
need for government protective legislation.

